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I. INTRODUCTION 
My work largely focuses on fresh water and fresh water governance. Fresh water is the second most impor-
tant of the natural resources essential for human survival and thriving. Only air is more ubiquitous, essential, or vari-
able than water. Among water‘s many qualities, one that causes innumerable disputes and perhaps occasional con-
flict is that water moves, and in moving ignores human boundaries. The most cordial and cooperative of neighboring 
states have had difficulty in arriving at mutually acceptable arrangements to govern transboundary waters even in 
humid regions were fresh water is usually sufficient to satisfy most or all needs.
1
 Even units of a federal union lo-
cated in a humid region have engaged in long and bitter political and legal struggles over the waters they share.
2
 
When one adds in aridity, conflicts can become endemic and intense despite otherwise friendly relations or even 
membership in a federal union.
3
 Yet the ambulatory nature of water creates a need for cooperation among the same 
groups who are contending over it. In fact, considerable evidence suggests that cooperative solutions to water prob-
lems are more likely than prolonged conflict.
4
  
Looking at the resulting problems in an international context raises questions about how to structure coop-
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eration in a way that increases trust and eliminates water as a source of contention. The world‘s experience has dis-
closed that while international law by itself cannot solve this problem, international law is an essential element of 
any solution.
5
 For those who are not familiar with international law, just what it is or how it operates is often a puz-
zle. Some will doubt whether there even is such a thing, or, as it is often put, whether international law really is law. 
The question has been asked increasingly emphatically at least since John Austin in the nineteenth century.
6
 To an-
swer this question, one must consider the forms that international law takes and how it functions. This analysis be-
gins with a consideration of how law works in general. 
II. WHAT MAKES LAW LAW? 
The question of whether international law really is law is a question of legitimacy—whether the interna-
tional law and international legal processes are accepted as justified in prescribing and enforcing norms.
7
 Legitimacy 
is partly a function of perceived fairness in procedures and partly a function of perceived rightness (at least in gener-
al) of result. Societies whose governance is perceived as legitimate can carry on for decades or centuries without 
necessarily making particularly good decisions; when societies come to reject the legitimacy of their institutions, its 
governance structures collapse rather quickly from what often appear in hindsight to be rather slight shocks.
8
 This 
section will discuss the reasons why so many people question the legitimacy of international law. 
This question of legitimacy for international law arises in large measure because many people have in mind 
a specific model of how law works when they describe something as a law and some claim of right or obligation as 
legal. This model envisions a legislature acting formally to create a highly determinate rule enforced by a policeman. 
As George Jackson put it, ―The ultimate expression of law isn‘t order, it‘s a prison.‖9 This notion of law is called 
―legal positivism‖ because it focuses attention solely on ―positive‖ law, law that is formally enacted and formally 
enforced. John Austin was the foremost proponent of legal positivism writing in English in the nineteenth century. 
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Austin defined law as ―the command of a sovereign‖ to be enforced by some form of sanction.10 By this theory, the 
practice of law pertains to the identifying the commands of an identified sovereign and properly using those com-
mands to achieve a desired result. Austin himself concluded that international law simply cannot be law, but was 
merely ―positive morality,‖ because he was unable to identify a sovereign who issued commands or formal legal 
mechanisms for enforcing such commands.
11
  
Most people who live under highly developed national legal systems are probably comfortable with the 
foregoing description of what law is and how it operates. Reflection, however, discloses that this model does not 
explain what we call ―law‖ even in national legal systems. Consider the mundane examples of traffic laws. In the 
United States, nearly everyone drives faster than the legal speed limit and there could never be enough police to 
compel people to drive at or below that limit. If the government attempted to do so, it would fail because too many 
are violating the law. The best that can be achieved is to keep most people driving not very much faster than the 
speed limit through selective enforcement targeted at those who violate the limit too egregiously.
12
 Yet the legally 
prescribed limit remains ―the law‖; no one can avoid conviction for speeding on the basis that the law is not effec-
tively enforced or that the designated speed limit is not ―the law.‖ 
 Contrast speed limits with traffic lights. People in the United States seldom simply drive through red lights 
(although they sometimes cheat a little). Yet if nearly everyone were to disregard them, the laws on driving through 
those lights could no more be enforced than the speed limits. Most people do not drive through red lights from self-
interest: Driving through a red light is more dangerous than speeding, and would be suicidal if nearly everyone did 
so. When only a few are violating a rule, a few police are adequate to enforce the rule. Yet one‘s response to anoth-
er‘s driving through a red light is not simply that the act is dangerous. People see driving through a red light as anti-
social behavior and support the law as law. According to H.L.A. Hart, the twentieth-century‘s leading legal positiv-
ist, the decision to obey traffic signals, and the sense of moral outrage against those who do not, is legal and not 
merely a moral because drivers would refer to the law to explain their actions and thoughts.
13
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 Now consider the more subtle situation with the law applicable to a contract or to a tort. Contracts, volunta-
rily defined and assumed obligations, are an essential feature of modern life. Without compliance with contracts, the 
planning necessary for modern economies would be impossible. Every developed state has a well-developed law of 
contracts, and this law tends to be highly technical. Yet business people, let alone consumers and others who might 
find themselves enmeshed in disputes relating to contracts, often know nothing about these technicalities, or, even 
worse, ―know‖ something about these technicalities that is false. As a result, one study of the contracting process in 
Wisconsin found that at between 60% and 75% of the contracts made in the state between wholesalers and retailers 
(depending on the nature of the industry) were not valid under the state‘s law of contracts, largely because of errors 
in the process of contract formation.
14
 Such ―legal‖ problems are probably typical of contracts in most places around 
the world. Yet business between wholesalers and retailers in Wisconsin or elsewhere does not suffer.   
 Contracts actually are enforced not so much by formal law as by informal sanctions based on the sense of 
the relevant community, and such enforcement often turns out to mean radically different results than would be 
achieved were the parties to resort to legal processes.
15
 A decision to resort to litigation is a signal of a far greater 
problem than mere failure to fulfill a particular promise; it signals a decision to break off all relations and to impede 
the possibility of entering into future relations with the person being sued.
16
 Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (―UCC‖) that now provides the law of sales of goods throughout the United States, 
embraced the reality that the law of contracts is found in commercial practice rather than in legal technicalities by 
dispensing with the formalities of contract formation in favor of a very flexible standard that would rarely fail be-
cause of ignorance of the law.
17
  The relevant provision is UCC § 2-204: 
§ 2-204. Formation in General. 
 (1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including 
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. 
 (2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its 
making is undetermined. 
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 (3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fall for indefiniteness if the 
parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy. 
Provisions such as this can hardly be characterized as ―commands of a sovereign‖ without seriously distorting the 
actual functioning of the legal system. Such rules rather accept that the parties themselves form a community and 
within that community create law for themselves.
18
 While this truth is seldom explicit in the common law, it is the 
central tenet of contract law in the civil law tradition.
19
 Such rules indicate, again, that the true basis of contracts and 
commercial law is the social sense of legitimacy granted to or withheld from particular voluntary conduct, just as it 
is with speed limits and traffic lights. 
 The Austinian paradigm that so many now seem to think of as the ―natural way‖ to think about law is a 
relatively recent idea; it essentially strips the notion of law down to organized coercion or the threat of organized 
coercion:  a ―command,‖ of a ―sovereign,‖ backed by a ―sanction.‖20 As this brief discussion demonstrates. this is a 
wholly inadequate notion of what law is and how law operates. The point was perhaps best captured in an observa-
tion by Professor A.L. Goodhart: ―It is because a rule is regarded as obligatory that a measure of coercion may be 
attached to it; it is not obligatory because there is coercion.‖21 Even modern positivists have conceded as much when 
they embrace a normative explanation of positive law that does not depend on an identifiable ―sovereign‖ or the 
presence or absence of a ―command‖ or a ―sanction.‖ Thus Hans Kelsen has developed a widely influential positiv-
ist theory where legitimacy derives from a ―grundnorm‖ (a ―basic norm‖ or ―basic law‖) that in turn just is, or at 
least is derived from social notions that are not explicable in legal terms.
22
 H.L.A. Hart also developed a positivist 
approach to law that seeks to explain the origins and functions of law without reliance on a coercion theory of law. 
Hart posits a ―habit of obedience‖ as the source of law and legitimacy.23 These theories, particularly Hart‘s ―habit of 
obedience,‖ seem inadequate to capture the sense of legitimacy that underlies law, yet they are closer to the reality 
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of what law is and why it is effective than a simple notion of command or sanction that are popularly thought of as 
constituting law.   
 Clifford Geertz, the noted anthropologist, reached a somewhat similar conclusion when he described ―law‖ 
as an organic mechanism whereby certain claims of right are elevated to the status of socially established norms and 
other claims of right are denied standing; it is a means for society to make sense of things.
24
 When normative judg-
ments are truly accepted as law, generally few will violate the norms and those who do will pay a higher price than 
someone who violates a mere social or moral convention. The price might well be exposure to official coercion, but 
it might also entail other social means of enforcement such as public censure or even ostracism.  
 This leaves us with a question: What is the function of formal law, of law on the books? History provides 
an answer. Informal law functions successfully when each person in a particular community knows the others in the 
community and what they are doing, each depends on the others for a wide range of social supports, and each realiz-
es that overreaching too far or too often will cost them the social supports that he or she needs to survive or to thrive. 
As a society becomes larger and social interaction becomes less personal, the complex web of mutual reciprocities 
that ensures compliance with the customary rules of the society breaks down. Formal law, particularly written for-
mal law with specialized processes to make and enforce law, arises as a response to that breakdown.
25
 Formal law 
provides a means to achieve adequate certainty and predictability of right and obligation to people in such a society. 
This was as true of Hammurabi‘s Babylon or the Rome of the Decemviri as it was of medieval Islam or medieval 
Europe.
26
 A good example is the process, described by David Trubek and his co-authors, whereby during the last 20 
years, under the impact of the creation of the European Union with its ―single market‖ and the resulting competition 
from English, Dutch, and American law firms, the French method of dealing with hostile corporate takeovers 
through informal arrangements among a few leading men has broken down to be replaced, both nationally and 
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extranationally, by a highly formal set of legal rules and institutions that mirror the similar institutions that were 
created as 90 years earlier in the United States and perhaps 10 years earlier in the United Kingdom.
27
 
 Opportunities to create certainty and at least the appearance of determinate outcomes knowable in advance 
multiplied enormously with the invention of the printing press. That invention made possible not only the mass dis-
tribution of ―law‖ in a way not before possible, it married formal law to the centralized state for it made centralized 
control possible, but only if legal actors (lawyers, jurists, and lay people who pay attention to formal law) were re-
quired to follow the letter of the law. From this possibility arose the characteristic form of modern law:  nationally 
unified legal systems that claimed a monopoly over legal questions.
28
 From these beginnings, intended to enable 
autocratic rulers to rule by law, emerged the important modern notion of the rule of law (the Rechtstaat).
29
 As this 
conclusion suggests, I do not denigrate the formal processes of law. Certainty and predictability are important val-
ues, particularly for those of who seek to make firm plans for the future. Formal law also serves the valuable social 
end of ensuring that the state itself abides by the law created by the state and by society. This brief introduction al-
lows a more nuanced and sophisticated exploration of the nature, functions, and failures of international law. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW 
International law operates on much the same basis as national law.
30
 It also experiences some of the same 
pressures to change and develop in the direction of greater formalism. International law until recently involved only 
a relatively small and structureless society of states. The United Nations was created at the end of World War II with 
only 51 members (Switzerland chose to stay out of the United Nations and a handful of defeated Axis states were 
excluded). The current membership of the United Nations approaches 200 with only one significant de facto state, 
the Republic of China (Taiwan), remaining outside the organization.
31
 Changes in the United Nations and in other 
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 See AMOS YODER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM (3rd ed. 1997). (Switzerland joined in 2002, after the Yo-
international structures have transformed the international legal system from the relatively simple forms of the past 
to an increasingly diverse and complex community of actors who too often no longer know much about each other. 
The United Nations and other international organizations also count as full players (―legal persons‖) in the interna-
tional legal system.
32
 Rapidly proliferating non-governmental and other official and semiofficial participants are also 
now playing a distinct albeit subordinate role.
33
 Even natural and artificial persons (people and corporations) are 
now recognized to some extent as participants in the international legal community.
34
  
This growing community of states and other entities introduced into international legal processes a larger 
variety of sharply differentiated cultural traditions than the smaller group of states from before World War II. These 
differences were further accentuated by the division of the world into contending ideological camps.
35
 This is pre-
cisely the setting in which the participants can be expected to welcome the emergence of more specialized and more 
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formal legal structures.
36
 That has certainly happened at the regional level—consider, for example, the Association 
of Southeast Asian States, the European Union, or the North American Free Trade Association—as well as globally 
for specialized forms of activity—for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, and the World Trade Organization. Still, in large measure, the international legal system 
remains institutionally underdeveloped and decentralized.
37
 In short, international law in many respects still is a 
primitive legal system.
38
   
The international legal system viewed as a whole lacks the superstructure of specialized institutions—
executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative—found in modern national legal systems. But to conclude from 
this lack that international law is not really law is to confuse particular institutional arrangements with what law re-
ally is and how it really operates.
39
 Modern legal systems function in far more complex ways than a simplistic focus 
on ―positive law‖ suggests, a way that implicates a perhaps remote link to custom as a primary source of law. For if 
one asks why do you obey a law and the answer is because the legislature (or whatever) enacted it, why should we 
care that the legislature enacted it? If the answer is because the constitution says so, why should we tolerate the rule 
of the living by the dead?
40
 The answer is and must be custom, just as it is with why speed limits are not enforced 
effectively. Moreover, the absence of formalized courts, legislatures, and executives no more indicates an absence of 
law in the international system than the absence of those institutions indicated the lack of law in pre-industrial socie-
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ties the world over.
41
 The international system‘s less formal processes similarly are law and must be examined care-
fully to learn both its capabilities and its limitations. 
Modern political and legal theory today generally bottoms all law on the consent of the governed.
42
 While 
the roots of the centrality of consent to international law are different from the roots of the centrality of consent for 
national law, international law too rests on the consent of the participants—classically nation states. Some today 
argue to rooting international other than in the consent of states, including religion revelation,
43
 natural law,
44
 or the 
consent of the global population rather than of states.
45
 None of these alternatives has gained any traction among 
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governments,
46
 international organizations, or international tribunals and thus will not be considered at length here. 
Instead, the following sections will follow the short, definitive statement of the forms of international law found in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted 
to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.  
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties 
agree thereto.  
The remainder of this chapter will consider these classic sources of law in the order listed in the statute of the court. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
By international conventions, Article 38 means any form of voluntarily expressed international agreement. 
Even a unilateral oral declaration can create an obligation under international law if the government on the behalf of 
which the declaration was made intends to subject itself to an obligation.
47
 As this suggests, there is no particular 
form required and, from the perspective of an international tribunal rather than a national court, compliance with 
national legal requirements is not required so long as the government‘s representative meant the declaration or ex-
change to create an international obligation.
48
 
The relation of international agreements to the consent of participating states is clear. International agree-
ments, like private contracts, provide the law for the parties thereto.
49
 So clearly is this understood that nations 
usually comply with their international agreements without requiring any steps to enforce the agreement—unless the 
state has a proper basis for questioning the validity or meaning of the agreement or for an internationally recognized 
legal excuse for non-compliance. These possibilities are enshrined in two well-known Latin maxims: pacta sunt 
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servanda
50
 (agreements are to be observed) and rebus sic stantibus
51
 (so long as things remain the same, in other 
words, unless there is a sufficiently substantial change in circumstances). What brings these two apparently contra-
dictory principles together is an implied obligation to interpret and perform international agreements in good faith.
52
 
There can be complex questions about whether the state parties had actually reached an agreement, what the agree-
ment means, and whether there is a legally valid excuse from compliance. Many international agreements also re-
solve the problem of enforceability by providing for compulsory arbitration or other means.
53
 
Today, the answers for the most part are found in the rules gathered in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.
54
 Left unanswered by the Vienna Convention is why treaties are legally binding or how they create law. 
For private contracts, their binding nature comes from some underlying body of law.
55
 The same is true for the in-
ternational legal effect of international agreements. The underlying body of law is not, cannot be, just another treaty, 
and the Vienna Convention does not claim to provide the legal basis for enforcing other agreements. The underlying 
law that gives legal effect to international agreements is customary international law, just as custom ultimately un-
derlies positive law within a national system.
56
 This is made clear when one discovers that the Vienna Convention 
itself has now been widely recognized as being binding, at least for most of its provisions, as customary law on na-
tions that have not ratified it.
57
 But unlike positive law in a national legal system, customary law is not merely a 
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57 The Avena Case (Mexico v. United States), 2004 ICJ REP. ¶ 83; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
deep background to treaties. It is very much in the foreground as a direct source of legal obligation as well as the 
underlying matrix in which international agreements are imbedded. 
V. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Customary international law is more complex and uncertain than formal agreements like treaties or conven-
tions. Customary international law consists of the practices of states undertaken out of a sense that the practice is 
required by law (opinio juris sive necessitatus, often referred to as simply opinio juris).
58
 If these two elements 
combine, law results regardless of how long—or how briefly—the practice has continued.59 This is consistent with 
the standards for finding a binding custom in national law.
60
 Such customary law is binding because the participat-
ing states have expressly or implicitly consented to the rule.
61
 References to law connect a customary practice to a 
sense of legitimacy, and thus constitute the practice as law in a highly decentralized and institutionally undeveloped 
system like international law (or among subsistence farmers or nomadic tribesmen).  
An analogy suggested some 90 years ago by Pitt Cobbett, an English professor of international law, makes 
clearer the process by which customary international law develops.
 62
 Suppose, as a result of global climate change, 
people begin to settle a newly thawed island in two villages. A meadow emerges between the two villages, with no 
road across the meadow. People initially tend to wander at will in order to go from one village to the other. Gradual-
ly, most people come to follow a particular path. Perhaps it is the shortest route, or perhaps it is the easiest route, or 
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perhaps it is the route most convenient to the heaviest walkers—walkers whose tread wears a path more decisively 
into the land. For whatever reason, a definite path will emerge, and gradually it will become a road. Eventually, eve-
ryone will agree that this road is the right way to travel from village to village. When, at some point, people begin to 
object that people who follow other paths are trespassers, we have a legal and not merely a factual claim. If that 
claim is accepted by the people living on the island, we have a customary rule of law, even though no one can say 
precisely when this rule took hold. 
Customary international law emerges in an analogous process, developing through a process of claim and 
counterclaim between states.
63
 Often the states involved reach a consensus, expressed through an exchange of dip-
lomatic notes or other means, about what each state is entitled to do in the circumstances at hand. When a state un-
dertakes an action that affects other states, the other states will either acquiesce in the action or take steps to oppose 
it, usually at first through rhetorical strategies; if the matter is important enough to an objecting state, it eventually 
will escalate its opposition by imposing a variety of sanctions up to the possibility of military operations. Regardless 
of which state prevails, over a period of time a pattern of practice emerges that allows one to predict how states will 
behave. If nothing more were involved, one might well question whether this were anything that could properly be 
termed law, yet beginning with the simplest rhetorical strategies and continuing right through to outright war, states 
on both sides of a controversy refer to international law as a primary justification of their claims and their practic-
es.
64
 Diplomats know very well the difference between appeals to law, appeals to morality, and appeals to expe-
dience; they often express these different propositions at appropriate points in their statements and assertions. 
Customary international law works satisfactorily when there are only a few participants in a particular in-
ternational process (a regional or special custom) or when general customary international law operates without ma-
jor controversy either because there is a broad consensus on what is proper under the circumstances or because other 
states are unwilling to challenge the one or few states with a strong interest in the matter.
65
 The major analytical dif-
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ference between a special custom and a general custom is that a special custom binds only states that can be shown 
actually to have consented to the custom, while a general custom is presumed to bind a state unless the state can 
show that it has consistently resisted (or objected to) the custom.
66
 Thus to determine whether customary interna-
tional law exists and what its content is requires diplomats, international tribunals, lawyers, and scholars to examine 
a wide variety of sources of state practice; finding evidence regarding the reasons for the practice is more challeng-
ing.
67
  
A widespread pattern of treaties or other international agreements may demonstrate that a practice is so 
widely followed that it has become a rule of customary law binding even on states not party to the treaty.
68
 Under 
some circumstances, even an unratified treaty is indicative of customary law.
69
 General Assembly resolutions and 
resolutions of other international organizations are strong evidence that states consider a particular rule to be a legal 
obligation, leaving to be determined whether state practice actually is consistent with this opinio juris, although dip-
lomats, lawyers, scholars, and even international tribunals often overlook the question of whether state practice is 
actually consistent with such resolutions.
70
 Even unilateral acts of states can demonstrate that the particular state 
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embraces a particular customary rule of law.
71
  
The process of determining customary international law, even when successful, is ―inelegant.‖72 It often 
leaves gaps and ambiguities in the law. Treaties and other international agreements only sometimes fill these gaps or 
clarify the ambiguities. Despite the obvious difficulties in determining the precise content of customary international 
law, the system has been remarkably successful. No form of international life could exist without a shared set of 
norms that are largely self-effectuating in the conduct of that life.
73
 Only by focusing exclusively on the relatively 
few, albeit highly dramatic, situations where international law has failed can one gain the impression that the system 
is ineffective.
74
  
Successful areas of customary law often are codified under United Nations or other auspices, a codification 
made possible precisely because the rules are so seldom questioned and so generally followed.
75
 The principal organ 
through which the United Nations begins such a codification is the International Law Commission, a body created 
by the General Assembly in 1947 to help codify and ―progressively develop‖ customary international law.76 The 
Commission consists of 34 jurists and diplomats who represent a broad range of legal cultures and political ideolo-
gies. As a result, consensus often comes after years of debate, a process that lends a high degree of credibility to the 
resulting codification. Upon reaching a conclusion, the Commission reports its findings to the General Assembly, 
which may or may not take steps to turn the finding (usually termed ―draft articles‖) into a legally binding instru-
ment. In fact, the rules assembled by the Commission often are accorded ―quasi-legal effect‖ as rules of international 
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law even before they take the form of a binding legal document.
77
  
Even when a body of customary law has been codified, however, parts (even a great deal) of it often sur-
vive as customary law. Thus, while the law of the sea has been codified in a series of international conventions, 
much of this highly successful body of law remains customary if only because many states have declined to ratify 
some or all of these conventions.
78
 Another example is the virtual outlawry of chemical weapons despite the inabili-
ty of the international community to ratify a treaty dealing with more than a small part of that concern.
79
  
Customary international law empowers international actors by legitimating their claims, but it also con-
strains them by limiting the claims they are allowed to make.
80
 Customary international law is, in some respects, ill-
fitted to perform these functions as it frequently is ill-defined and uncertain. These are characteristics of all customa-
ry law, and not just customary international law. Identifying when a practice has crystallized as customary law and 
the precise content of such customary law has been difficult, requiring research into the proffered reasons for a prac-
tice in what often are obscure sources. Furthermore, turning as it does on a question of motive, any examination of 
the primary evidence for a customary rule is often inconclusive. That, plus the lack of a neutral enforcement me-
chanism, makes exclusive reliance on customary international law both undesirable and impossible. 
VI. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
International agreements cover a growing area of international legal concerns, while customary internation-
al law covers much of the rest. Neither body of law, however, pretends to be comprehensive, leaving gaps on partic-
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ular points that must be filled through recourse to ―general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.‖81 At 
one time the phrase ―civilized nations‖ was meant to limit reference to nations within the European cultural sphere.82 
Today, the source of general principles of law could be more aptly described as those found in ―representative legal 
systems,‖ which in turn are drawn from all corners of the globe.83 Oscar Schachter has gone further, suggesting that 
there are in fact five types of general principles applied by international decision makers:
84
 (1) principles of munici-
pal law ―recognized by civilized nations‖; (2) general principles of law ―derived from the specific nature of the in-
ternational community‖; (3) principles ―intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal systems‖; (4) principles 
―valid through all kinds of societies in relationships of hierarchy and co-ordination‖; and (5) principles of justice 
founded on ―the very nature of man as a rational and social being.‖ 
Recourse to general principles of law reflects a conclusion that if all (or nearly all) national legal systems 
embrace a point of law, nations can hardly complain if that point of law is applied in their relations with other na-
tions. General principles could almost be seen as special sort of custom, with the incorporation of the legal principle 
into national law as state practice and its use as implicit consent to the validity of the legal principle.
85
 Yet not all of 
Schachter‘s schematic of ―general principles‖ can be easily linked back to some sort of implicit consent and there-
fore some commentators describe ―general principles‖ as a form of ―nonconsensual‖ international law86—something 
of an oxymoron for classical international law. Soviet scholars argued that ―general principles of law‖ required proof that 
the principle had been accepted as a rule of customary international law or authorized by a treaty.
87
 Such a reading would render 
art. 38(1)(c) utterly superfluous. Instead, demonstrating that a general principle of law exists requires a comparative in-
quiry into the legal practices of representative legal systems (no one could claim to have examined all legal sys-
tems), and no inquiry at all into whether a state has actually intended or consented to having that principle applied in 
their interstate relations. Such consent as one might conclude applies is strictly implicit or even assumed. 
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While general principles of law can be useful for filling gaps in international law, their utility is limited. 
The wider the range of legal systems examined, the less specific any agreement among them on legal principles are 
likely to be. Thus, an arbitral tribunal held that limitations on the timeliness of the presentation of a claim applied 
between states even without proof of an agreement or custom because the temporal limitations were a general prin-
ciple of law.
88
 The tribunal had to determine whether the delay in the instant case was so long as to have imposed an 
unreasonable burden or risk on the other state.
89
 More recently, some scholars have attempted to identify ―global 
administrative law principles‖ by recourse to general principles of administrative law found in national legal sys-
tems.
90
 When state practice internationally is not consistent with even clearly identified general principles applied in 
national law, presumably state practice (customary law, perhaps) prevails over the general principles.
91
 
VII. THE WORK OF THE MOST HIGHLY QUALIFIED PUBLICISTS 
International legal processes, particularly regarding determining whether there is a binding custom or gen-
eral principle of law, requires extensive surveys of state practice, national laws, and the reasons underlying the prac-
tices and national laws. Legal advocates and tribunals seldom have the time or resources to do such surveys tho-
roughly, and any such survey from an advocate is likely to be suspect as a self-serving inquiry into the evidence. 
The international legal system therefore turns to the work of the leading scholars of international law (the ―most 
highly qualified publicists‖ as the Statute phrases it) for evidence of what the law is, as opposed to what they think 
the law should be.
92
 Reliance on the ―most highly qualified publicists‖ for research and analysis of the primary 
sources of evidence of what customary international law actually is does not authorize scholars to create law accord-
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ing to their notions of what the law ought to be,
93
 although this can be a fine distinction in practice. 
This possibility opens up two interesting aspects for finding secondary sources of international law prac-
tice: recourse to international or national tribunals; and private organizations for the study of international legal is-
sues. International law, unlike the common law, does not have a formal rule of precedent.
94
 Nonetheless, judges or 
arbitrators generally are experts on customary international law so that their opinions are the ―opinions of highly 
qualified publicists.‖95 Thus other courts, diplomats, and scholars frequently refer to such opinions of evidence of 
what international law is.
96
 It is important to remember that these decisions do not make law or bind other courts, or 
even the same court. Given the prestige of the particular members of a court, the opinion might, however, carry great 
weight in determining whether there is in fact a customary rule of law or an applicable general principle.
97
 
Another particularly influential form of expert opinion is a report or ―codification‖ of one or another of the 
international associations of legal experts that have flourished since the nineteenth century. Leading examples are 
l’Institut de droit international, the Inter-American Bar Association, the International Bar Association, and the In-
ternational Law Association.98 While these groups have no official standing as lawgivers, the importance of the opi-
nions of the ―most highly qualified publicists‖ in customary international legal processes give them an importance 
that would be remarkable for a similar group in a national legal system. Their opinions carry special weight because 
of the stature of the members who worked on these projects, and because the approval of the end result carries the 
imprimatur of a large and diverse body of expert opinion.  
The International Law Association, a highly-regarded nongovernmental organization of legal experts 
founded in 1873, has been particularly influential. One of its best known and most influential efforts was the Helsin-
ki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers,99 which the Association approved in 1966. The Helsinki 
Rules were the first attempt by any international body to codify the entire law of international watercourses. The 
rules heavily influenced state practice as well as the efforts of other international associations in examining the law 
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of internationally shared fresh waters.100 The UN‘s International Law Commission based its 1997 Convention on the 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses101 on the Helsinki Rules. In 2004, the International 
Law Association revised the Helsinki Rules to produce the Berlin Rules on Water Resources,102 an even more com-
prehensive summary of the customary international law applicable to all waters. Whether the Berlin Rules will be as 
influential as the Helsinki Rules remains to be seen. 
VIII. PROCEEDING EX AEQUO ET BONO 
The second paragraph of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that, it the par-
ties to the proceedings agree, the court can decide a case ex aequo et bono (―according to what is fair and good‖).103 
This invites decision according to personal notion of justice, that is, on non-legal grounds of fairness. Such an invita-
tion is quite different from recourse to ―equity‖ or ―equitable‖ as the standard under an international rule of law. 
―Equity‖ or ―equitable‖ under a rule of law is a legal standard for which, over time, specific criteria develop and 
which must be applied like  any other rule of law might be applied.
104
 Because of the freedom accorded decision 
makers, deciding ex aequo et bono requires express consent by the state parties to the dispute. Such a power has 
rarely been conferred on an international tribunal, and never on the International Court of Justice.
105
 
IX. SUMMARY 
Even when a norm of customary international law has been determined with some certainty, the customary form 
of enforcement—claim and counterclaim among states—does not provide a neutral enforcement mechanism. The 
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mechanism favors those with power and resources. Without a neutral enforcement mechanism, there is always the 
suspicion that national interest overrides any real commitment to law. And without a neutral enforcement mechan-
ism, international law ultimately has nothing better to offer for punishing violations than the law of the vendetta.
106
 
The institutional limitations of international law have always been most clear during periods of major crisis.
107
 This 
is true as well for treaties if the treaty does provide an adequate enforcement mechanism. A related problem for trea-
ties as they proliferate is the creation of overlapping and not entirely consistent legal regimes that cause conflicts 
and disputes about which treaty regime is to take precedence.
108
  
International law is not an illusion, but it is a primitive system with definite limits on its effectiveness.
109
 As a 
result, while international law by itself cannot solve the world‘s problem, international law is an essential element of 
any solution.
110
 What is necessary to make international law more effective is a fully developed institutional frame-
work, particularly for any serious or enduring crisis, although that framework might not come into being until after 
the crisis emerges. To get beyond the limitations of current international law, states must combine the sophisticated 
insights of international lawyers with the practical structures of political actors through institutions for managing or 
resolving conflicts before they escalates to injurious levels. 
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